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FRAUD, MISTAKE, AND SECTION 1983 PRISON
CLAIMS: WHY THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE SHOULD BE AMENDED TO
REQUIRE HEIGHTENED PLEADING FOR
SECTION 1983 INMATE LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act1 was enacted to provide equal
treatment to all U.S. citizens, prisoners, and nonprisoners alike.2
Now, however, claims brought by prisoners under Section 1983 flood
the federal civil court docket, creating a nuisance and wasting valuable
judicial resources.3  This is particularly true in states that require fact
pleading because the federal system requires merely plausibility or no-
tice pleading;4 therefore, prisoners in those states are more likely en-
couraged to engage in forum shopping by filing their lawsuit in federal
courts.5
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
2. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S
HANDBOOK: HOW TO BRING A FEDERAL LAWSUIT TO CHALLENGE VIOLATIONS OF YOUR
RIGHTS IN PRISON 5 (Rachel Meeropol & Ian Head eds., 5th ed. 2010), https://ccrjustice.org/
sites/default/files/assets/files/Report_JailHouseLawyersHandbook.pdf.
3. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014 (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (“Prisoner petitions
rose 18 percent (up by 7,541 petitions) to 48,406.  Prison condition cases surged 69 percent (up
by 5,418 petitions) as one Arizona state prison inmate filed more than 5,400 petitions in both the
District of Arizona and the Middle District of Tennessee.  Prisoner civil rights petitions increased
7 percent (up by 1,088 petitions)”); Table C-2—U.S. District Courts–Civil Federal Judicial
Caseload Statistics (March 31, 2014), U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2014/03/31 (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Table C-2];
see Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in
Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 935–36 (1990) (stating that civil rights
actions constitute the most significant portion of the federal court dockets and asserting that
while the number of cases brought in federal district courts has increased by 235%, the number
of civil rights actions has increased by 2,000%); see also Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A
Permanent Stop Sign: Why Courts Should Yield to the Temptation To Impose Heightened Plead-
ing Standards in § 1983 Cases, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 267, 291 (2002); Eric Kugler, A 1983 Hurdle:
Filtering Meritless Civil Rights Litigation at the Pleading Stage, 15 REV. LITIG. 551, 551 (1996).
4. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Erikson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007) (per curiam); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957),
abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State
Courts After Twombly and Iqbal, in POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, 2010 BACK TO THE FU-
TURE: PLEADING AGAIN IN THE AGE OF DICKENS? 3–7 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038349
(providing the background on notice pleading and briefing the Twombly decision).
5. Spencer, supra note 4, at 17–20. R
213
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While federal courts require notice pleading or plausibility plead-
ing,6 some states, including Illinois7 and several others, require fact
pleading—a heightened standard.8 Conley v. Gibson, a U.S. Supreme
Court case, mandated notice pleading for federal courts and held that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 only requires a short and plain
statement in the complaint that gives the defendant fair notice of the
suit.9 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly10 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal11 may
have heightened the federal pleading standard, but the U.S. Supreme
Court has maintained that the federal standard remains below height-
ened pleading.12 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit,13 another U.S. Supreme Court case, held that
heightened pleading is not appropriate for federal Section 1983 claims
alleging municipal liability.14  Despite this holding, many circuit courts
continue to require heightened pleading for Section 1983 claims in
6. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 570.
7. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-603 (2014) (“All pleadings shall contain a plain and concise state-
ment of the pleader’s cause of action, counterclaim, defense, or reply.”).
[T]he basic law regarding the nature of a complaint . . . requires that it contain a state-
ment of facts constituting the cause of action claimed. A complaint that does not allege
facts, the proof of which are necessary to entitle a plaintiff to judgment, fails to state a
cause of action. The complaint must contain factual allegations of every fact which must
be proved in order for the plaintiff to be entitled to judgment on the complaint, and a
judgment cannot be rendered on facts demonstrated by evidence at trial unless those
facts shown were alleged in the complaint.
Beckman v. Freedom United Coal Mining Co., 527 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ill. 1988) (quoting In re
Beatty, 517 N.E.2d 1065, 1069 (Ill. 1987)).
8. John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 355–58
(2002/2003); Spencer, supra note 4, at 14–18, tbls.1 & 2.  Over half of the states replicate the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and require notice pleading.  Spencer, supra note 4, at 14.
These are called replica states.  The remaining states have pleading standards that differ from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 17.  These are called nonreplica states.  Of the
nonreplica states, few states require notice pleading, while the remaining states require fact
pleading, including: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia). Id. at 18 n.63.
9. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48, 47 n.8.
10. But see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547 (holding that there is not a heightened pleading require-
ment, but plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face”).
11. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that a complaint must pass the plausi-
bility standard).
12. Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (reaffirming that “[Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8] requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’ Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
13. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
14. Id. at 168–69.
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other contexts because Leatherman’s holding is limited to municipal
liability.15
There are three main reasons for subjecting Section 1983 prison
claims to a heightened pleading standard.  First, and most importantly,
differing pleading standards in federal and state courts encourage fo-
rum shopping16 and the flood of Section 1983 claims reduces the fed-
eral courts’ efficiency—especially in states that require fact pleading.17
When federal courts decide Section 1983 claims, the state statute of
limitations, immunities, and privileges standards are already borrowed
from the forum state;18 thus the state’s heightened pleading standards
should be borrowed as well.  Second, Section 1983 prison claims
should be made an exception to federal notice pleading—a low plead-
ing standard—for the same principle that fraud and mistake are ex-
ceptions:19 claims that are quasi-criminal require a heightened
pleading standard.  Section 1983 prison claims are quasi-criminal and
fit into the current exception to notice pleading.20  Third, despite the
U.S. Supreme Court’s reiteration that federal courts require notice
pleading,21 many circuit courts, in practice, continue to require height-
ened pleading in certain instances.22
15. See generally Paula Wolff, Annotation, Propriety and Effect of Heightened Standards of
Pleading or Production Required of Plaintiff in Action Under 14 U.S.C.S. § 1983, 144 A.L.R. Fed.
427 (1998) (describing the background of the heightened pleading standard and the trend among
federal courts both before and after Leatherman).
16. Timothy S. Rigsbee, Standing Erie on Its Head: Should Federal Law Govern Pleading
Standards for Section 1983 Civil Rights Claims Brought in the State Courts of Illinois?, J.
DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N, Mar. 1998, at 41, 41, http://www.dcba.org/page/vol100398art7.
17. See Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, a Chicago attorney who defends Section 1983
claims in federal court (Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with author).  Pasquinelli predicts that if Section
1983 prison claims were subjected to a heightened pleading standard similar to that of the state
of Illinois, more attention could be given to claims of merit.
18. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 128, 171, 177 (Kris Markarian ed.,
2014).
19. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).
20. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atkins v. Mclnteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Requiring relators to plead FCA claims with particularity is especially important in light of the
quasi-criminal nature of FCA violations (i.e., a violator is liable for treble damages).  Rule 9(b)
ensures that the relator’s strong financial incentive to bring an FCA claim—the possibility of
recovering between fifteen and thirty percent of a treble damages award—does not precipitate
the filing of frivolous suits.”).  The False Claims Act (FCA) authorizes any private person to
bring an action in the name of the United States against anyone who files a claim proscribed by
the FCA.  31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(1) (2012).  Subjecting a person to triple the damages is arguably
quasi-criminal because the litigants have more on the line than a typical civil suit.  This is akin to
criminal suits where a litigant is subject to larger fines and possibly jail time.
21. Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957).
22. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 582–84 (2002).
Before 1993, federal courts required notice pleading for several reasons, including the desire to
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Some scholars claim that Section 1983 claims should not be sub-
jected to a heightened pleading standard, but they are mistaken.
These scholars’ arguments focus on the correlation between the heft
of a pleading and the success of a case,23 the benefits of meritless liti-
gation,24 and the prisoners’ sympathetic nature; however, courts can-
not reap justice for prisoners when they are too clogged by Section
1983 prison claims.25  Once the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
amended to require a heightened pleading standard for these claims,
the decongested federal court docket will bring efficiency to all
states.26
Part II of this Comment discusses the background of Section 1983
pleading requirements in federal court, the relevant U.S. Supreme
Court cases relating to these requirements, pleading standards for
state and federal courts, the common types of Section 1983 prison
claims, and the quasi-criminal nature of the prisoners’ claims that
flood the docket.27  Part III of this Comment argues that a heightened
pleading standard should apply to Section 1983 prison claims in fed-
eral court, particularly in states that adhere to fact pleading, because:
(1) federal notice pleading encourages forum shopping, which over-
crowds the federal docket; (2) Section 1983 prison claims are quasi-
prevent vexatious litigation and protect the municipalities.  United States v. City of Philadelphia,
644 F.2d 187, 206 (3d Cir. 1980) (requiring fact pleading because the potential for frivolous suits
causes municipal defendants to suffer expense and harassment).  After 1993, the use of height-
ened pleading was struck down for Section 1983 cases against municipalities.  Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cty. Narcotics & Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).  Nonetheless,
federal courts were still unsure about whether heightened pleading was permitted.  Some courts
disallowed heightened pleading, some permitted heightened pleading in all but municipal liabil-
ity actions, and others permitted heightened pleading when intent was an element of the claim.
See, e.g., Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 72–73 (1st Cir. 1998), overruled by Educadores
Puertorriquenos en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing the require-
ment that an illegal motive be pled with specific, nonconclusory facts still survives Leatherman);
Edington v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. 52 F.3d 777, 779 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Doe v. Cassel,
403 F.3d 986, 988–89 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (explain that Leatherman struck down height-
ened pleading for complaints seeking damages against government officials, but heightened
pleading may still apply in individual capacity suits); Baxter v. Vigo Cty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728,
743 (7th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Guzman v. Sheahan,
495 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2007) (“There is no heightened pleading requirement for civil rights ac-
tions.”); see also infra notes 253–88.
23. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 120 (2011).
24. Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89
IND. L.J. 1191 (2014).
25. See Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes a Look at Heightened Pleading Standards in
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1085,
1085–86 (1994).
26. See infra notes 304–13 and accompanying text. R
27. See infra notes 32–182 and accompanying text. R
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criminal offenses; and (3) many circuits already apply a heightened
pleading standard for Section 1983 prison claims in practice.28  Part III
of this Comment also debunks the popular arguments against imple-
menting a heightened pleading standard for Section 1983 prison
claims.29  Finally, Part IV of this Comment explains the impact of an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would re-
quire fact pleading for Section 1983 prison claims.30  This Part notes
that subjecting prisoners to heightened pleading for Section 1983
claims will clear the congestion in federal courts, discourage forum
shopping, and bring uniformity to federal and state courts.31
II. BACKGROUND
A. An Introduction to Section 1983
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides a cause of action to
those whose constitutional or legal rights are infringed on by state or
federal government actors.32  It was enacted to enforce equality and
combat racism during the 1960s.33  In fact, “Section 1983 was origi-
nally known as Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.”34  The Act
“does not mention race, . . . but it was originally passed specifically to
help African-Americans enforce the new constitutional rights” en-
acted after the Civil War.35  “Although these Amendments became
law, white . . . judges in the state courts refused to enforce these
[Amendments]”36 so a federal remedy was necessary.  Hence, Section
1983 was enacted.
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape37 in 1961, it
transformed Section 1983 into a valuable tool for state prisoners be-
28. See infra notes 183–275 and accompanying text. R
29. See infra notes 276–303 and accompanying text. R
30. Although this Comment proposes the need for an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the specifics of that amendment are outside the scope of this Comment. See
infra notes 304–20 and accompanying text. R
31. Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17 (explaining that in his experience litigat- R
ing Section 1983 claims brought by inmates, a vast majority of these claims are brought in federal
court because notice pleading is more lenient than the state pleading standard).  Not only do
Section 1983 claims flood the federal court docket, a majority of these Section 1983 claims are
brought by inmates. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
33. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 2, at 5. R
34. Id.
35. Id. (“[S]pecifically, the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Those
amendments made slavery illegal, established the right of ‘due process of law’ and equal protec-
tion of the laws, and guaranteed every male citizen the right to vote.”).
36. Id.
37. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monnell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
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cause the Court stated that the Act was meant as a supplemental fed-
eral remedy to state laws.38  In Monroe, petitioners brought a Section
1983 suit against state police officers and city officials arguing that the
warrantless search of their home, and ultimately their warrantless ar-
rest, violated their constitutional rights.39  The Court addressed
whether the petitioners could file a Section 1983 claim against state
government officials in federal court.40  The Court in Monroe held
that Section 1983 applies to state officials because state officials act
under the color of law.41  Additionally, the Court held that the indi-
viduals injured under the Act were entitled to a federal remedy even
if the state actors violated a state law.42  This meant that state prison-
ers could file federal claims in federal court when federal or state gov-
ernment officials wronged them.  Once Section 1983 became a federal
remedy for people injured by state government actors, prisoners soon
began to file more federal suits challenging state prison abuses.43
A Section 1983 claim is comprised of four elements: (1) a violation
of rights protected by the U.S. Constitution or other federal law; (2) a
proximate cause linking the violation of rights and the action com-
plained of; (3) a person causing the violation of rights; and (4) the
person’s action is taken under color of law (statute, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any state, territory, or district).44  A plaintiff can
38. Id. at 174–77; SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 2. R
39. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170.
40. Id. at 180–83.
41. Id. at 187; SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 1–2. R
42. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
43. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 1–3 (“With Monroe opening the door to the federal court- R
house, constitutional litigation against state officials developed.  Later, plaintiffs seeking mone-
tary damages sued not only state officials, but began to sue cities and counties as well.  They also
sought prospective injunctive relief against state officials.  Ultimately, the federal court became
the principal forum for bringing state and local governmental policies and practices into compli-
ance with federal law.” (footnote omitted)).  Before Section 1983 became a remedy against state
officials, prisoners could only file Section 1983 lawsuits if they were wronged by federal agents.
L.A. Cty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 34–38 (2010) (noting how the legislative history shows that
municipalities may be subject to prospective relief under Section 1983 only when a violation of
federal rights is attributable to enforcement of municipal policy or practice).  Now, since Section
1983 became a remedy for citizens wronged by state officials, prisoners can bring lawsuits when
wronged by government agents in state prisons as well.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170–71
(1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (explaining
that Section 1983 provides a federal remedy independent of state law remedies and is available
even when state official acted in violation of state law).  Because state and federal government
agents are subject to § 1983 liability, the number of lawsuits filed under Section 1983 inherently
increased.  See Table C-2, supra note 3, for a breakdown of the numbers and types of lawsuits R
filed in federal courts.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). But see Jerald Jay Director, Annotation, Relief Under Federal
Civil Rights Acts, to State Prisoners Complaining of Conditions Relating to Corporal Punishment,
Punitive Segregation, or Other Similar Physical Disciplinary Measures, 18 A.L.R. Fed. 7, 14
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 7 18-JAN-16 12:32
2015] SECTION 1983 INMATE LITIGATION 219
make a claim under Section 1983 by satisfying two main requirements:
“(1) the conduct complained of was engaged in under color of state
law, and that (2) such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the depriva-
tion of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the federal Con-
stitution and laws.”45
A plaintiff can satisfy the under “color of law” prong by suing gov-
ernment employees and entities for actions executed pursuant to their
governmental duties.46  Therefore, defendants must be government
employees acting in a manner pursuant to their duties at the time of
the incident.  This color of law criterion is usually very clear; however,
it becomes difficult when a petitioner sues a private actor not em-
ployed by the government but arguably considered a government
agent, such as a physician under state contract.47
Plaintiffs satisfy the “deprivation of rights” prong by claiming a vio-
lation of their constitutional due process rights or a violation of a fed-
eral law.48  To claim a violation of constitutional due process, plaintiffs
may assert a procedural or substantive due process claim.49  Procedu-
ral due process claims are brought when a law is unconstitutional be-
cause it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.50  “A court
encountering a procedural due process claim must first determine
whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a life, liberty, or property
interest that is [constitutionally protected as a matter of substantive
law].”51  Courts examine the process that accompanies the deprivation
of a protected right to decide whether the procedural safeguards built
into the process are constitutionally adequate.52  Common Section
1983 claims alleging procedural due process violations fall under the
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution.53  On the other hand, substantive due process claims are lim-
(1974) (postulating that although Section 1983 lists four elements, in practice, only two elements
exist).
45. Director, supra note 44, at 14. R
46. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 2.  Examples of people acting under color of law include R
police officers and prison employees because they are employed by either the federal or state
government. See id. at 82.
47. See, e.g., West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (holding that a physician under contract with
the state to provide medical services acts under the color of law); Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312 (1981) (holding that a public defender does not act under the color of law for purposes of
Section 1983).
48. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 34–45 (describing procedural and substantive R
due process).
49. Id. at 34.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 37–38 (using Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as an example).
53. See generally id. at 29.
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ited to “matters [of] marriage, family, procreation, and the right to
bodily integrity.”54  In addition to asserting a violation of the U.S.
Constitution, plaintiffs can also assert that government officials vio-
lated a federal statute.55  The National Labor Relations Act and the
Medicaid Act are examples of federal statutes actionable under Sec-
tion 1983.56
When government officials are sued under Section 1983, they often
assert the defense of qualified immunity:57 a defense for an official
who is sued in her individual capacity for damages.58  The purpose of
qualified immunity is to protect government officials from a burden-
some discovery process on insubstantial claims or on claims that assert
violations of the law and are not clearly established.59 Pearson v. Cal-
lahan60 altered the way by which courts handle the qualified immunity
defense.61  Before Pearson, courts were required to first determine if
an official violated a constitutional right before deciding if the individ-
ual was protected by qualified immunity.62  Now, after Pearson, courts
may first decide that an individual is protected from suit by qualified
immunity and avoid the constitutional determination.63  The intersec-
tion of Section 1983 and the appropriate pleading standard have an
intricate history.
B. History of Notice Pleading: The Federal Pleading Standard
Federal courts require notice pleading.64  According to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s juris-
diction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs
54. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 40 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994)).
55. Id. at 75.
56. Id. at 76–77.
57. See generally Colin Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 468 (2011) (describing the history & recent changes to the qualified immunity defense).
58. See generally Karen M. Blum, The Qualified Immunity Defense: What’s “Clearly Estab-
lished” and What’s Not, 24 TOURO L. REV. 501 (2008) (describing the elements of qualified
immunity).
59. Id. at 501.
60. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).  Afton Callahan sued police officers who conducted a warrantless
search of his home incident to arrest. Id. at 227. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity because the officers did not violate a clearly established law.
Id. at 227.
61. Rolfs, supra note 57, at 474 R
62. Id. at 473.
63. Id.
64. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HOW.
L. J. 99, 101 (2008).
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no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand
for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.65
In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court coined the term “notice pleading”
when it interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 in Conley.66
Petitioners in Conley brought a class action under the Railway Labor
Act claiming that the railway union discriminated against African-
American employees by failing to represent them.67  The U.S. Su-
preme Court held that Rule 8 only requires ‘“a short and plain state-
ment of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”68  The Court
held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claim-
ant to set forth factual details at the pleading stage.69 Conley stood as
a guarantee that civil rights claimants would at least reach the discov-
ery stage without being forced to plead factual details.70
Although notice pleading was the accepted pleading standard for
federal claims prior to Leatherman, many federal courts required
heightened pleading for Section 1983 prison claims.71  Traditionally,
through common law, federal courts required heightened pleading
when prisoners brought civil rights claims under Section 1983 in an
attempt to weed out frivolous claims.72  In Elliot v. Perez,73 the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the notice pleading rule must be narrowly tai-
lored in Section 1983 prison claims to assure the defendants’ substan-
tive rights are protected from the immense burdens of pretrial
preparations that are inherent to Section 1983 claims.74  In Elliot, a
grand jury witness brought a Section 1983 claim against a state judge,
assistant district attorney, and other officials, claiming that the grand
jury proceedings violated her civil rights.75  The district court dis-
missed the complaint based on the defendant’s assertion of absolute
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
66. Spencer, supra note 64, at 104–05. R
67. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 43 (1957).
68. Id. at 47 (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8.).
69. Id. at 45–46.
70. Spencer, supra note 64, at 101. R
71. Wolff, supra note 15, at 438. R
72. Karen M. Blum, Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After Leatherman?, 44 CATH. U.L.
REV. 59, 59, 79 (1994).
73. 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985), abrogated by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelli-
gence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
74. Elliot, 751 F.2d at 1479; Blum, supra note 72, at 71. R
75. Elliot, 751 F.2d at 1474.
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immunity,76 but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judg-
ment.77  In vacating, the court held that because the complaint alleged
a Section 1983 violation, the district court should have required the
plaintiff to plead specific facts demonstrating a cause of action for a
civil rights violation before dismissing the complaint.78  Similarly, the
D.C. Circuit79 and the Second Circuit80 required civil rights com-
plaints to plead specific facts.  This tradition of requiring plaintiffs to
adhere to a heightened pleading standard changed with Leatherman.81
In 1993, Leatherman, a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, defined
the necessary pleading standard for Section 1983 claims.82  In
Leatherman, petitioners filed suit under Section 1983 against munici-
pal corporations alleging that the police officers’ conduct while
searching their homes violated the Fourth Amendment.83  The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case for failure to meet a
heightened pleading standard.84  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
and held that heightened pleading could not be applied in Section
1983 cases.85  The holding was limited to municipal liability cases, and
the U.S. Supreme Court did not address the application of heightened
pleading when the defendant is not a municipality.86  This left open
the question of whether heightened pleading could be applied against
an individual government officer—a defendant who is not a
municipality.87
In 2007, Twombly established a new federal pleading standard,88
but the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts still adhered to
the lenient standard of pleading stated in Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
76. Elliott v. Perez, 561 F. Supp. 1325, 1337 (E.D. La. 1983), vacated, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir.
1985), abrogated by Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163.
77. Id. at 1482.
78. Id. at 1479.
79. E.g., Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835, 839–40 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Blum, supra
note 72, at 73 (examining Siegert v. Gilbert, 500 U.S. 226 (1991)). R
80. E.g., Powell v. Workmen’s Comp. Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 136–37 (2d Cir. 1964).
81. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993).
82. Id. at 168–69.
83. Id. at 165.
84. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054,
1058 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
85. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167–68.
86. Id.; Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1063
(2003) (explaining that while the rhetoric of Leatherman is sweeping, the holding is very narrow
because it only applies to municipal liability cases).
87. Fairman, supra note 22, at 584–85. R
88. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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dure 8.89  In Twombly, the U.S. Supreme Court reinterpreted Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it held that a pleading must demon-
strate the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim.90  This standard came to
be known as plausibility pleading.91  The wording in Twombly92 dif-
fered from the language in Conley93 because a short and plain state-
ment is not the same as a plausible statement.94  Although it appeared
that the U.S. Supreme Court stepped away from notice pleading, it
stated no intention of departing from the previously accepted rule95
articulated in Conley.96
Less than two weeks after Twombly, in Erikson v. Pardus, the U.S.
Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 8’s simple “short and plain state-
ment” requirement remained the accepted pleading standard for fed-
eral courts.97  In Erikson, a prisoner filed a pro se Section 1983 claim
alleging that prison medical officials diagnosed him with hepatitis C
but discontinued his treatment.98  The prisoner pled that the prison
violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unu-
sual punishment.99  The Tenth Circuit dismissed the claim because it
stated only conclusory allegations.100  The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed the dismissal and held that Rule 8 required only a short and
plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.101  Al-
89. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008)
(comparing Twombly and Conley); Spencer, supra note 64, at 124–25. R
90. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (noting that a pleading must contain “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). But see Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(per curiam) (stating that the federal pleading standard simply requires a short and plain
statement).
91. Spencer, supra note 89, at 432. R
92. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
93. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
only requires “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice
of the plaintiff’s claim”) (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))).
94. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. But see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (requiring a pleading to
contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).  Nonetheless, both
standards fall short of heightened fact pleading.
95. Erikson, 551 U.S. at 93 (2007) (stating that the federal pleading standard simply requires a
short and plain statement); Daniel R. Karon, “T’was Three Years After Twombly and All
Through the Bar, Not a Plaintiff Was Troubled from Near or from Far”—The Unremarkable
Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Re-exposed Pleading Standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 571, 594 (2010).
96. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (setting the federal standard of notice pleading).
97. Karon, supra note 95, at 594–95 (referring to Erikson, 551 U.S. 89). R
98. Erikson, 551 U.S. at 89–90.
99. Id. at 89.
100. Id at 90.
101. Id. at 93 (“[Rule 8] requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
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though in 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court reapplied the plausibility stan-
dard when deciding Iqbal, the Court also reiterated that the short and
plain statement standard of Rule 8 applies.102  Whether the federal
pleading standard is called notice pleading or plausibility pleading, re-
quiring litigants to plead a short and plain statement that is plausible
is a far less stringent standard than requiring litigants to plead facts on
the face of their complaints as required by heightened pleading.
Although Leatherman held that the heightened pleading standard
could not be applied in Section 1983 cases against municipalities, cir-
cuits continue to require a heightened pleading standard for Section
1983 claims in a roundabout way.103  After Leatherman, there was a
circuit split over whether and in what circumstances courts could re-
quire heightened pleading for Section 1983 prison claims.104  The Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits employ an expansive view of Leatherman,
applying it to all civil rights cases.105  According to these circuits, there
are no special pleading requirements for nonmunicipal Section 1983
claims, even in an individual capacity; moreover, the accepted federal
pleading standard is notice pleading.106  On the other hand, the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits limit Leatherman’s prohibition of heightened
pleading to municipal liability actions and require heightened plead-
ing for Section 1983 claims brought against officers in their individual
capacity.107  The Ninth Circuit applies heightened pleading, but only
to a subset of Section 1983 claims when intent is an element of the
alleged tort.108  The D.C. Circuit requires a heightened pleading stan-
dard to all individual capacity Section 1983 claims.109  Although these
circuits apply heightened pleading to certain Section 1983 claims,
these standards are not explicitly authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.110
C. Notice Pleading Exceptions
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain explicit exceptions to
notice pleading by stating instances in which heightened pleading is
102. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–68 (2009).
103. Wolff, supra note 15, at 438, 445, 449. R
104. Fairman, supra note 22, at 582. R
105. Id. at 584.
106. See Blum, supra note 72, at 78 (examining the Seventh Circuit’s position in Triad Assocs., R
Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 1993)).
107. Fairman, supra note 22, at 585–86. R
108. Id. at 587–88.
109. Blum, supra note 72, at 78. R
110. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 9.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 13 18-JAN-16 12:32
2015] SECTION 1983 INMATE LITIGATION 225
necessary.111  For example, fraud or mistake112 require a heightened
pleading standard because they are quasi-criminal charges.113  Ac-
cording to Rule 9, when “alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud or mis-
take[;]”114 however, “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condi-
tions of a person’s mind and other elements may be alleged
generally.”115  In applying Rule 9, “lower courts also scrutinize con-
spiracy allegations with care,” and “broad, vague charges of conspir-
acy [in a pleading] do not suffice.”116  As such, Rule 9 requires
heightened pleading specificity for fraud and conspiracy claims, in-
cluding the ‘“who, what, where, when and how’ of the fraud” and the
conspiracy.117  These pleading specificity rules are “designed to dis-
courage a ‘sue first, ask questions later’” approach.118
In essence, for quasi-criminal cases of fraud or mistake the interests
at stake are more substantial than the loss of money; therefore, a
more stringent standard is applied.119  The exceptions to notice plead-
ing relate to claims that are quasi-criminal because pleading with par-
ticularity is especially important in light of quasi-criminal violations.120
A quasi-criminal claim contains some qualities of a criminal prosecu-
tion,121 such as a Section 1983 excessive force or false arrest claim.  A
different standard applies to fraud and other quasi-criminal viola-
tions122 for a few reasons.  A heightened pleading for these offenses
protects the reputation of the defendant, deters frivolous suits, and
provides adequate notice.123  Thus, the legislature recognized that
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).
112. Id.
113. United States ex rel. Atkins v. Mclnteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006); see also
Wojcik v. InterArch, Inc., No. 13-cv-1332, 2013 WL 5904996, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2013).
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 9.
115. Id.
116. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 450 (1986) (footnote omitted).
117. Wojcik, 2013 WL 5904996, at *5 (quoting AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 615
(7th Cir. 2011)).
118. Id. (quoting Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co.,
631 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2011)).
119. Caroline Ayres Teichner, Markedly Low: An Argument to Raise the Burden of Proof for
Patent False Marking, CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389, 1398 (2011).
120. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atkins v. Mclnteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006).
121. Quasi-Criminal Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
122. Teichner, supra note 119, at 1398. R
123. Fairman, supra note 22, at 563–64 (using Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., R
176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999) as an example describing the purposes of Rule 9(b)).
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when a charge may seriously damage an individual’s reputation, more
facts should be required at the pleading stage.124
Although fraud, mistake, and conspiracy are the only exceptions to
notice pleading stated by the U.S. Supreme Court or listed in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure,125 there are several other federal claims
that contain elements of heightened pleading in practice.126  First,
courts implement targeted use of heightened pleading to certain ele-
ments of antitrust claims by requiring greater factual specificity as to
the conspiracy element and also for allegations of fraudulent conceal-
ment.127  Second, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)128 to
facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste and require plaintiffs to
plead specific facts for these environmental litigation claims.129  Third,
the Copyright Rules of Practice130 differ from the Federal Rules on
the matter of pleading.131  Courts embrace a four part heightened
pleading requirement for copyright claims that requires the plaintiff to
state: “(1) which specific original work is the subject of the copyright
claim, (2) that the plaintiff owns the copyright, (3) that the work has
been registered[,] . . . and (4) by what acts and during what time the
defendant infringed the copyright.”132  Fourth, even after Leatherman,
some federal courts require pleading with specificity for defamation
cases.133  Fifth, some jurisdictions apply Rule 9 to negligent misrepre-
sentation claims, and this standard is justified because negligent mis-
representation is similar to fraud.134  And lastly, sixth, some
jurisdictions apply Rule 9 to predicate acts of racketeering, but there
is a universal heightened pleading where mail or wire fraud is the
predicate act.135
In general, heightened pleading is applied toward claims that “re-
present important segments of activity in the litigation boom” and
124. Fairman, supra note 22, at 564. R
125. See generally Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) can only be applied
to fraud or mistake, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression meaning some excludes
all others).
126. See Marcus, supra note 116, at 449–50. R
127. Fairman, supra note 86, at 1011–15 (2003). R
128. Id. at 1021.
129. Id. at 1021–22.
130. Id. at 1037.
131. Id. at 1036–37.
132. Id. at 1038 (footnote omitted).
133. Fairman, supra note 86, at 1043–47. R
134. Id. at 1048–49.
135. Id. at 1052–55.
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present problems for potential abuse because they involve behavior
that can result in substantial liability depending on the defendant’s
state of mind.136  A heightened pleading standard for Section 1983
prison litigation may protect defendants from damaging claims and
deter frivolous lawsuits.137
D. State Pleading Standards
To understand why federal pleading standards encourage forum
shopping, it is essential to understand that some states have pleading
standards that differ from those in federal courts and those articulated
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; therefore, plaintiffs are able
to choose a more favorable forum and impact the load on respective
court dockets.138  However, over one-half of the states and the District
of Columbia are “replica states” using pleading standards that “repli-
cate or are based largely on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”139
In response to Twombly, these replica states are split on the issue of
whether the appropriate pleading standard is notice pleading or plau-
sibility pleading.140  The states that do not incorporate the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in their own rules are called nonreplica
states.141  Among the nonreplica states, there are two categories: (1)
states that require notice pleading; and (2) states that require fact
pleading.142  Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin merely
require notice pleading for state claims and also require that com-
plaints brought in state court contain a short and plain statement to
give the defendant notice of the suit.143  The remaining seventeen
nonreplica states require fact pleading, thus, complaints brought in
state court must contain factual allegations.144  Illinois, for example,
initially appears to embrace notice pleading,145 but in fact, its case law
requires fact pleading to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
136. Marcus, supra note 116, at 450. R
137. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 206 (3d Cir. 1980) (requiring fact
pleading because the potential for frivolous suits causes municipal defendants to suffer expense
and harassment); Fairman, supra note 22, at 582. R
138. See Spencer, supra note 4, at 17. R
139. Id. at 14.
140. Id. at 14–16, 14–16 tbls.1 & 2.
141. Id. at 17.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Spencer, supra note 4, at 17–18, 18 n.63. R
145. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-603 (2014) (“All pleadings shall contain a plain and concise
statement of the pleader’s cause of action, counterclaim, defense, or reply.”).
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state a cause of action.146  When petitioners residing in fact pleading
states consider venue for bringing a lawsuit, they realize that a com-
plaint brought in state court must contain more factual allegations147
as opposed to a complaint brought in federal court.148  Thus, fact
pleading states have a pleading standard that differs drastically from
the federal courts, enticing plaintiffs to choose a more favorable
forum.
E. Section 1983 Prison Claims
Section 1983 prison claims are plentiful.149  Common Section 1983
prison claims relate to corporal punishment, punitive segregation, in-
adequate medical care, excessive force, or other similar physical disci-
plinary measures.150  These claims may be protected under the First
Amendment’s right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion,
the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Eighth Amendment’s right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to equal
protection and due process of law.151  Most Section 1983 prison claims
are brought under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause, while the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause applies to arrestees or pretrial detainees alleging mistreat-
ment.152  The appropriate standard is whether the officers acted with
deliberate indifference.153  All prisoners have rights to procedu-
ral due process, equal treatment, medical treatment, and effective
counsel.154
146. Rigsbee, supra note 16, at 42 (discussing Beckman v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., R
527 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. 1988)).
147. See, e.g., Peraica v. Riverside-Brookfield High Sch. Dist. No. 208, 999 N.E.2d 399, 404
(Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
148. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2013).
149. Approximately 17% of all civil cases on the federal docket in 2013 were prisoner civil
rights cases. Table C-2, supra note 3. R
150. Director, supra note 44, at 11–12; Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17 (ex- R
plaining the most common Section 1983 claims that he litigates).
151. Director, supra note 44, at 13–15. R
152. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996).
153. See, e.g., Martinez v. Burns, 459 F. App’x 849, 851 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
prison nurse did not meet the standard of deliberate indifference to violate the defendant’s
Eighth Amendment rights); Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1490–91 (holding that police officers did not act
with deliberate indifference to violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of an
inmate).
154. 42 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1043, 1045 (2013).
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Most prison claims either allege the use of force by government of-
ficials or inadequate conditions of confinement.155  For example, gov-
ernment officials may be subject to Section 1983 claims when they use
force to control their suspects, pretrial detainees, and prisoners.156
The source of this claim depends on the petitioner’s status, but as
stated supra, prisoners typically rest their claims on the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, whereas
arrestees157 and detainees tend to rely on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause.158  For conditions of confinement claims,
prisoners must prove that the officials acted with subjective, delibera-
tive indifference and that the deprivation was sufficiently serious
under an objective standard.159  When prisoners are deprived of their
rights, they are entitled to a remedy.160
Examples of Section 1983 prison claims brought under the Eighth
Amendment are abundant.  In Lira v. Herrera,161 a prisoner in Pelican
Bay Prison filed a Section 1983 claim after being placed in segregation
and then in a special housing unit based on his gang affiliation.162  He
claimed that the officers jeopardized his safety and violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by
assigning him a cellmate with no consideration to gang affiliation.163
In Minor B v. Duff,164 a prisoner in an Illinois youth center filed a
Section 1983 claim against prison guards after alleged sexual and
physical abuse.165  Again, the prisoner claimed that these actions vio-
lated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.166  In Lang Vo Tran v. Illinois Department of Correc-
tions,167 a prisoner at Pinckneyville Correctional Center filed a Sec-
155. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 45–47, 65–67. R
156. Id. at 45–46.
157. Id. at 57–60 (describing the factors laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine
whether force of a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment).
158. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (holding that three factors were relevant in
determining the reasonableness of force: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (2) “whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”; and (3) “whether
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”).
159. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834–39 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
302–04 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976); SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at R
65–67.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing prisoners a cause of action).
161. 427 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2005).
162. Id. at 1165–66.
163. See id. at 1168.
164. No. 06 C 4912, 2009 WL 2147936 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2009).
165. Id. at *1.
166. Id. at *12.
167. No. 09-302-GPM, 2011 WL 816630 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2011).
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tion 1983 claim against the prison personnel alleging that he was
denied medical treatment for his hernia while incarcerated.168  Once
again, this claim relied on the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right,
which is a procedural due process claim brought by a state prisoner
against a state facility.169
While these claims may appear legitimate, Section 1983 prison
claims are presumed frivolous by some judges.170  The presumption of
frivolousness arises because these claims consume almost 20% of the
federal civil docket.171  While litigants should be sanctioned for filing
frivolous lawsuits, this does not always happen, especially when they
file lawsuits pro se and in forma pauperis.172  Rule 8’s simplified
pleading standard is meant to work in conjunction with Rule 11 sanc-
tions.173  Thus, pleadings need only contain a short and plain state-
ment, but litigants, and usually their attorneys, will be sanctioned if
frivolous lawsuits are filed.  Because prisoners are often pro se and
indigent, courts do not always inflict sanctions on them for filing inad-
equate complaints.174
The legitimate claims cannot overshadow the mass amounts of friv-
olous claims brought under Section 1983.175  For example, in Franklin
168. Id. at *1.
169. Id. at *2.
170. Blaze, supra note 3, at 936–37 (citing Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. R
1968)).
171. See Korb & Bales, supra note 3, at 291 (stating that Section 1983 prison claims occupy R
approximately 17% of a federal court’s docket).  There were 303,820 total cases filed in federal
district courts. Table C-2, supra note 3.  Of those, 18,306 were civil rights lawsuits filed by prison-
ers. Id.
172. Debra Cassens Weiss, House Passes ‘Lawsuit Abuse’ Bill Reinstating Mandatory Rule 11
Sanctions; ABA Opposes It, ABA J. (Nov. 5, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/house_passes_lawsuit_abuse_bill_reinstating_mandatory_rule_11_sanctions_aba/ (“The
U.S. House of Representatives has passed a ‘lawsuit abuse’ bill that reinstates mandatory sanc-
tions for frivolous claims in federal courts under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”). But
see Pro Se Litigants Subject to Rule 11 Sanctions, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 1994, at 10, https://
www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1994/dec/15/pro-se-litigants-subject-to-rule-11-sanctions/ (dis-
cussing Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1994)).  In Warren, plaintiff-inmate filed a
Section 1983 lawsuit as a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis. Warren, 29 F.3d at
1387–88.  After the lawsuit was dismissed, the district court decided not to issue Rule 11 sanc-
tions. Id. at 1388.  The court of appeals held that a litigant’s ability to pay is a factor for deciding
whether to issue sanctions.  Id. at 1390.
173. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17 (explaining that R
Rule 11 acts as a check on Rule 8, and that Rule 8 allows litigants to plead a “short and plain
statement,” but if the pleading is too frivolous, the litigants may be sanctioned under Rule 11).
174. See, e.g., Warren, 29 F.3d 1386.  Mr. Pasquinelli has defended numerous Section 1983
prison claims.  Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17.  He does not recall many times
in which a pro se prison plaintiff was required to pay Rule 11 sanctions. Id.
175. See Blaze, supra note 3, at 979 n.280 (explaining that the federal in forma pauperis stat- R
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, permits indigent individuals to file claims notwithstanding their inability to
pay court costs and litigation expenses).  “For example, in 1976 approximately 70% of civil rights
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v. Oregon,176 one zealous litigant brought several civil rights actions
deriving from the overwatering of a prison lawn, the baking of des-
serts in aluminum pans, and the fact that a seat belt requirement did
not apply to bicycles.177  Additionally, in Word v. Cook County De-
partment of Corrections,178 an inmate brought a Section 1983 claim
against the Department of Corrections for serving soft drinks contain-
ing artificial sweeteners.179  This claim was dismissed.180  In Russell v.
Bodner,181 a prisoner brought a civil rights claim based on the depriva-
tion of due process when a prison guard took cigarettes from his
cell.182
The low pleading standard allows frivolous claims to occupy space
on the federal court docket, whereas a heightened pleading standard
would remove frivolous claims but still permit claims with merit to
proceed.  Section 1983 claims cover an enormous amount of legal
ground and often afford prisoners with necessary remedies, but a rein-
terpretation of the required pleading standard is necessary for the rea-
sons stated infra.
III. ANALYSIS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to require
a heightened pleading standard for Section 1983 prison claims brought
in federal court.  Fraud and mistake require heightened pleading be-
cause they are quasi-criminal,183 and civil rights claims brought by
prisoners should be an exception to notice pleading for the same rea-
son.  Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to apply notice plead-
ing in federal courts,184 circuit courts continue to adopt a heightened
actions filed by inmates were dismissed as a result of initial review under § 1915.” Id.  (citing
William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Fed-
eral Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 618 (1979)).  To prevent abusive litigation, however, the
statute provides that a court may dismiss an action if it believes that the action is frivolous or
malicious.  28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012).
176. 563 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Or. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984).
177. Id. at 1317 (showing that the plaintiff attempted to file forty-nine lawsuits in the same
court and all the cases, except four, were dismissed).
178. No. 95 C 96, 1995 WL 29636 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 1995).
179. Id. at *1.
180. Id. at *3 (holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation be-
cause he did not show that the correctional facility was deliberatively indifferent to the health of
the inmates).
181. 489 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
182. Id. at 281.
183. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atkins v. Mclnteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006).
184. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
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pleading standard.185  In states that require fact pleading, federal no-
tice pleading for Section 1983 prison claims encourages forum shop-
ping, and the flood of Section 1983 claims reduces the federal courts’
efficiency.186  Despite some criticism,187 a heightened pleading stan-
dard for Section 1983 prison claims is the best solution for the effi-
ciency and fairness of the federal court system.  This section discusses
the three reasons for subjecting Section 1983 prison claims to height-
ened pleading: (1) notice pleading for Section 1983 prison claims en-
courages forum shopping; (2) Section 1983 prison claims are quasi
criminal and akin to the “fraud or mistake” exception to notice plead-
ing; and (3) federal courts require a heightened pleading standard in
practice.
A. Heightened Pleading for Section 1983 Prison Claims Is
Necessary Because Notice Pleading Encourages
Forum Shopping
Federal notice pleading for Section 1983 claims encourages forum
shopping, and the flood of Section 1983 prison claims reduces the fed-
eral courts’ efficiency.188  Although Section 1983, a concurrent juris-
diction statute,189 was enacted to provide plaintiffs an opportunity to
choose a forum, plaintiffs inherently choose a forum that is more
promising for them.190  While total uniformity between state and fed-
eral courts is unachievable,191 it is required to avoid overwhelming the
federal docket when a state forum and a federal forum have drasti-
cally different procedural requirements.192
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Leatherman resulted in dras-
tically different standards for Section 1983 claims in federal courts and
185. Wolff, supra note 15, at 444–45. R
186. See Rigsbee, supra note 16, at 46. R
187. Supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (explaining counter arguments, including: (1) R
research suggests that there is no correlation between the heft of a pleading and the ultimate
success of a case; (2) meritless litigation is very beneficial to courts; and (3) prisoners are mem-
bers of society with the least amount of liberty, so the pleading standard should be sympathetic
towards them).
188. See Rigsbee, supra note 16, at 46. R
189. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 26 (describing that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction R
over Section 1983 prison claims).  When plaintiffs assert federal claims in state court, states may
establish the rules of procedure governing litigation but may not apply state rules that unduly
burden, frustrate, or discriminate against the federal claim for relief. Id.  In state courts, federal
law provides the elements of the Section 1983 claim for relief and the defenses to the claim, and
state law may not alter either the elements or defenses. Id.
190. Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
1057, 1100 (1989) (article written before Leatherman).
191. Id. at 1101.
192. See id. at 1123–24.
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state courts adhering to fact pleading.193  Illinois, Nebraska, and Penn-
sylvania are the three states that adopt rules least similar to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure because these states require the strictest
fact pleading;194 therefore, forum shopping is most severe in these
states.195  In these states, Section 1983 litigants are required to plead
facts in state courts196 while they need only adhere to notice pleading
if they bring their lawsuit in federal court.  This disparity in pleading
standards leads to unmistakable forum shopping and the inequitable
administration of laws because prisoners tend to bring claims in the
federal court with the more lenient pleading standard.197
The flood of Section 1983 prison claims in the federal docket
reduces the court’s efficiency.198  Civil rights lawsuits are targeted as
one of the largest burdens on federal courts199 because a “litigation
explosion” of civil rights actions occurred in these courts.200  Civil
rights cases occupy close to 20% of a federal court’s entire caseload.201
Additionally, civil rights cases brought by inmates constitute almost
one-half of the civil rights cases on federal dockets.202 When federal
court dockets are overcrowded with frivolous prison lawsuits by peti-
tioners wanting to occupy their time,203 the courts cannot focus their
attention on the claims with merit or the other cases seeking dispute
193. See generally, Spencer, supra note 4, at 17–18, 18 n.63. R
194. Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of
Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 326, 326 n.61 (2001).
195. See id. at 326–28; see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of
Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 759, 782 (1995) (“Different procedural rules will have an
impact upon substantive justice.  Varying procedures will lead to forum shopping, unnecessary
cost, and widespread confusion.”).  Thus, because the local and state pleading standards differ
most in Illinois, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania these states are inherently more prone to forum
shopping.
196. See Main, supra note 194, at 327.  (“[S]tate courts of all three of the survey states are R
code pleading jurisdictions.”).  Code pleading is another term for “fact-pleading.” Id.  Code
pleading requires plaintiffs to state factual support the elements of their cause of action.
197. Rigsbee, supra note 16, at 46. R
198. Table C-2, supra note 3.  See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Esti-
mating the Costs of Civil Litigation, 20 COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (2013) (discussing the aver-
age cost of a lawsuit).
199. Kugler, supra note 3, at 551. R
200. Cottrell, supra note 25, at 1085. R
201. Korb & Bales, supra note 3, at 291.  Prison civil rights cases occupy 17% of the federal R
district court docket.  Table C-2, supra note 3. R
202. Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 295 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled by Cohen v. Norris, 300
F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962) (“[F]ew of the actions for violations of civil rights have any real merit.”);
Blaze, supra note 3, at 950 (quoting Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960–61 (D. Conn. 1968)) R
(articulating that many civil rights cases are frivolous by presumption).  In 2013, 34,667 civil
rights lawsuits were filed in federal district courts.  Of those civil rights lawsuits, 18,306 civil
rights lawsuits were filed by prisoners. Table C-2, supra note 3. R
203. See Blaze, supra note 3, at 935, 937. R
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resolution in the federal courts.204  Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be amended to require heightened pleading for Sec-
tion 1983 prison claims.
Although the fact pleading and notice pleading jurisdictions require
drastically different pleading standards, one particular study argues
that these standards tend to merge together.205  If this contention is
true, it does not explain why an overwhelming amount of Section 1983
prison claims are brought in federal court as opposed to state court.206
Alternatively, even if the pleading standards did merge, the merge
was likely caused by the lack of specificity in the pleading standards
relating to Section 1983 claims.207  Neither the standard of notice
pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the require-
ment of fact pleading under the state rules establishes a clear mandate
for the amount of specificity required in a Section 1983 complaint.208
In other words, because the courts do not have strict guidelines as to
what level of pleading is required, and because Leatherman is limited
to municipal liability,209 courts do not know what level of pleading
they can require of prisoner-petitioners.
By amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require
heightened pleading for Section 1983 prison claims, the federal cir-
cuits will no longer be confused about what pleading standard they
should require.210  This will allow both the federal and state courts to
properly administer justice to inmates deprived of their rights pro-
tected by Section 1983.
204. Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17 (explaining that the severe influx of R
meritless inmate litigation takes time away from the cases pleading constitutional harms).
205. See Main, supra note 194, at 319. R
206. Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17 (estimating, based on his experience R
litigating Section 1983 prison claims, that a vast majority of Section 1983 prison claims are
brought in federal court).  However, there are so few civil rights lawsuits and inmate lawsuits
that neither are a category in the statistical summary. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORTS OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS: STATISTICAL SUMMARY – 2013, at 2, 150 (2013), http://www
.illinoiscourts.gov/supremecourt/annualreport/2013/statssumm/2013_statistical_summary.pdf.
Rather, lawsuits filed by prisoners are placed in the miscellaneous category. Id.
207. Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17. R
208. Id.
209. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which authorizes heightened
pleading, does not apply to Section 1983 municipal liability actions).
210. See infra notes 241–75 and accompanying text. R
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B. Heightened Pleading Is Necessary for Section 1983 Prison
Claims Because They Are Quasi-Criminal and Similar
to Fraud or Mistake Claims.
When federal courts desire to import fact-based pleading require-
ments they borrow from other substantive areas of the law that re-
quire heightened pleading.211  Fraud is the seed of the heightened
pleading analysis.212  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
heightened pleading for fraud and mistake because they are quasi-
criminal offenses.213  Section 1983 prison claims are also quasi-crimi-
nal; thus a heightened pleading standard is justified.214
Section 1983 prison claims are quasi-criminal because most are
claims of “corporal punishment, excessive force, punitive segregation,
or other similar physical disciplinary measures.”215  These claims in-
volve a physical and violent nature—an underpinning of criminal
law.216  Sometimes, a prison official may be charged with a crime and
sued under Section 1983 for the same offense.217  For example, Sec-
tion 1983 claims are often brought simultaneously with other criminal
claims, such as battery218 or sexual assault.219  If a prison official com-
mits these acts, she may be liable under a state’s criminal law and
211. Fairman, supra note 86, at 1061. R
212. Id. (explaining that heightened pleading for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9 leads to the proliferation of heightened pleading in other areas by two distinct ways: (1) the
rationales for fraud’s heightened pleading is incorporated as justifications for other claims; and
(2) claims with fraud as a component import the fraud-based heightened pleading requirement).
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (stating that matters of fraud or mistake are to be pleaded with
particularity).
213. United States ex rel. Atkins v. Mclnteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006); Fairman,
supra note 22, at 563–65 (stating that the exceptions to notice pleading relate to claims that are R
quasi-criminal to protect the reputation of the defendant, deter frivolous suits, and provide ade-
quate notice).
214. Director, supra note 44, at 1 (litigating issues in Section 1983 claims concern “corporal R
punishment,” “punitive segregation,” and “physical disciplinary matters”; these are also litigated
items in criminal matters).
215. Id. at 11–12 nn.4–5 (defining “corporal punishment” as any kind of punishment inflicted
on the body, such as whipping, beating, and slapping; defining “punitive segregation” as occur-
ring when “a prisoner is taken out of the general population and placed in segregated confine-
ment . . . for the purpose of discipline”; defining “physical disciplinary measures” by contrasting
it with other prison discipline such as “withdrawal, forfeiture, modification, or denial of . . .
good-time allowance”).
216. JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 3
(6th ed. 2012).
217. See Jon Loevy, Section 1983 Litigation in A Nutshell: Make A Case out of It!, J. DUPAGE
COUNTY B. ASS’N, Oct. 2004, at 14, http://www.dcba.org/page/vol171004art2 (“Section 1983
claims may be brought in either federal or state court, in conjunction with other claims such as
state law counts for battery or false imprisonment.”).
218. E.g., Hinton v. Hanson, 47 F. App’x 325 (6th Cir. 2002).
219. E.g., Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989).
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under Section 1983.220  Therefore, lawsuits and criminal charges often
stem from the same occurrence in a prison setting.221
Section 1983 prison claims are also quasi-criminal because the rem-
edies for Section 1983 claims222 serve the same function as the reme-
dies for criminal charges: deterring future wrongful acts.223  It is a
serious societal wrong when prison officials abuse inmates, so, similar
to criminal charges, claims regarding physical disciplinary measures
should be taken very seriously.  Nevertheless, these claims must be
pled with particularity so that legitimate claims of abuse are not lost in
the flood of unmeritorious Section 1983 claims.
A different standard applies for fraud and other quasi-criminal vio-
lations to protect the reputation of the defendant, deter frivolous
suits, and provide adequate notice.224  These justifications are present
in Section 1983 prison claims as well.  First, when prisoners sue a
prison or prison official under Section 1983, it is important to protect
the reputation of federal or state institutions.225  For an efficient legal
system and an efficient functioning society, it is important for the pub-
lic to trust the penitentiary system and law enforcement.226  This pub-
lic trust falls apart when prison officials are constantly subjected to
Section 1983 lawsuits.227  Additionally, if public officials are defend-
ants to a Section 1983 lawsuit, they have less time to ensure the gen-
eral public’s welfare.228
220. Loevy, supra note 217, at 14. R
221. See, e.g., Smith v. Boudreau, 366 Ill. App. 3d 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (involving a prisoner
who was subjected to excessive force during an interrogation); Smith v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 277
Ill. App. 3d 335, 337 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (involving a Section 1983 prison claim subsequent to a
false imprisonment charge after a prisoner was arrested on a warrant).
222. See Cottrell, supra note 25, at 1101 (“[Section] 1983 was intended not only to provide R
compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against future constitu-
tional deprivations, as well.” (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980))).
223. See generally DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 216, at 29–38 (explaining that a purpose R
of punishment for a crime is to deter crime in the future).
224. Fairman, supra note 22, at 563–64 (using Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., R
176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999) as an example and describing the purposes of Rule 9(b)).
225. Fairman, supra note 86, at 1059 (arguing that justification for a heightened pleading stan- R
dard is stronger when defendants are public officials because they are especially susceptible to
reputational damage).
226. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983: Qualified Immunity, in 25TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION 9, 910–11 (PRACTICING LAW. INST. 2008) (quoting Barlow v. Owens, No.
Civ. A. G-04-557, 2005 WL 1719699, at **4–6 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2005)).
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Resignation of Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson Unlikely To Halt Protests,
FOX NEWS (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/11/30/ferguson-police-officer-dar-
ren-wilson-resigns/.  Officer Darren Wilson, who spent months as the suspect of a civil rights
investigation, eventually stepped down, but the investigation remains ongoing. Id.
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Second, “[t]here is a widespread belief that frivolous suits are re-
sponsible for many of the court system’s most serious problems, in-
cluding case backlogs, long trial delays, high litigation costs, and
excessive liability that chills innovation and impedes vigorous compe-
tition.”229  Rooted in the rationale of common law fraud, heightened
pleading is used to deter frivolous lawsuits in the area of civil rights
and fraud because these suits are presumptively frivolous.230  When
frivolous lawsuits are deterred, prison officials can focus on their jobs
without fear of litigation’s burdensome discovery231 but may still
know that they will be accountable if and when they violate a pris-
oner’s rights.232  State officers should not be dragged into a lawsuit
without just cause because they have important jobs to do, such as
ensuring the safety of citizens and prisoners.  This duty is diluted when
government employees must consistently defend themselves from friv-
olous claims.233
Third, Section 1983 claims, like fraud and conspiracy, have a very
detailed discovery process that burdens defendants more than plain-
tiffs.234  Section 1983 prison claims cost defendants, public officials,
policemen, and citizens much expense, time, and notoriety because
numerous documents and depositions must be produced.235  Judges
recognize this issue and often impose heightened pleading require-
ments.236  “In Anderson v. Creighton,237 the U.S. Supreme Court ac-
229. ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 18 (2003)
(footnote omitted).
230. Fairman, supra note 86, at 1060 (explaining that this presumption of frivolousness corre- R
lates to a protection-of-defendants rationale that manifests itself in two ways: (1) defendants
should be protected from burdensome discovery; or (2) the reputation of defendants should be
protected from frivolous lawsuits).
231. Id.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (stating that prisoners have a cause of action under Section 1983
when federal or state officials violate rights protected by the Constitution or a statute).
233. See Exam’r News Servs., Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits Cost Taxpayers a Fortune, SFGATE
(Oct. 23, 1995, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Frivolous-inmate-lawsuits-cost-tax-
payers-a-fortune-3123845.php.
234. See Kugler, supra note 3, at 557. R
235. Fairman, supra note 22, at 575. R
236. Id. at 574–76 (“Civil rights cases constitute the most active area of judicially imposed
heightened pleading requirements.  This device arose out of the . . . rationale of . . . protection of
the defendant. . . .  A heightened pleading burden on plaintiffs certainly shields defendants from
discovery and litigation expense.”).
237. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).  An FBI agent conducted a forcible warrantless search of a home in
the mistaken belief that a bank robbery suspect might be found there. Id. at 635.  The homeown-
ers filed suit against the agent in a Minnesota state court asserting a claim for money damages
under the Fourth Amendment. Id.  The agent removed the suit to a U.S. district court. Id.
Without any discovery having taken place, the district court granted the agent summary judg-
ment. Id.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that unresolved
factual disputes made it impossible to determine, as a matter of law, that there had been proba-
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knowledged that when the parties’ factual allegations differ, discovery
may be necessary before a summary judgment motion can be re-
solved.”238  Therefore, discovery is often necessary for Section 1983
prison claims even when the government’s summary judgment motion
is granted.239  Because the discovery process is so involved and bur-
densome on defendants, it is important to provide notice to the fed-
eral prison or prison officials.240  In addition to the justifications
mentioned infra, Section 1983 prison claims should be uniformly sub-
jected to a heightened pleading standard because they already are in
practice.
C. Heightened Pleading for Section 1983 Prison Claims Is
Necessary Because Federal Circuits Adopt Heightened
Pleading in Practice.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that notice pleading is
the appropriate standard, federal courts continue to adopt heightened
pleading in a roundabout way.241  The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure should adopt the pleading standard that the federal circuits deem
necessary for justice and efficiency.  Because the U.S. Supreme Court
has not decided a Section 1983 lawsuit since Leatherman in 1993, the
U.S. Supreme Court has not stopped the circuits from requiring a
prison claimant to plead facts in a Section 1983 claim.  Therefore, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should reflect this common practice.
After Leatherman, “the Fifth Circuit continued to require a civil
rights plaintiff to meet a heightened pleading standard” by switching
the plaintiff’s burden to the reply stage of the litigation.242  In Schultea
v. Wood (Schultea II),243 a plaintiff filed a suit against public officials
and claimed that officials “conspired to demote him after he reported
ble cause and exigent circumstances. Id. at 637–38.  The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded to the lower court. Id. at 646.  Specifically, the Court held that a federal law
enforcement officer who conducts a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment
will not be held personally liable for money damages if it is found that a reasonable officer could
have believed the search to be lawful. Id. at 635.  The court reasoned that discovery might be
necessary before the officer’s motion for summary judgment could be resolved. Id. at 646, 646
n.6.
238. Id. at 646 n.6; Gary T. Lester, Schultea II—Fifth Circuit’s Answer to Leatherman—Rule 7
Reply: More Questions Than Answers in Civil Rights Cases? 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 413, 459 (1996)
(citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6).
239. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983: Qualified Immunity, in 2 25TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 9, 910–11 (PRACTICING LAW INST. 2008) (quoting Barlow v. Owens,
No. Civ. A. G-04-557, 2005 WL 1719699, at *4–6 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2005)).
240. See Fairman, supra note 22, at 589. R
241. Wolff, supra note 15, at 443–44. R
242. Lester, supra note 238, at 445–46. R
243. 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995).
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to state authorities that one of the [officials] might be involved in ille-
gal activity.”244  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss.245  With respect to the Section 1983 prison claim, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that if the defendant pleads qualified
immunity as a defense, the plaintiff must meet a heightened pleading
standard in a detailed reply.246  The Fifth Circuit requires the plaintiff
to plead facts even before the defendant raises the issue of immunity,
or the court could dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12247 for failure to state a claim.248  Rule 7, which states the
acceptable forms of pleadings,249 contains a detailed reply require-
ment that allows the Fifth Circuit to place a burden of heightened
pleading on the plaintiff while still complying with Leatherman250 and
Rules 8251 and 9252 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The court
in Schultea II concluded that the Rule 7 reply can be detailed and does
not have to meet the plain and simple notice-pleading standard.253
While this approach is effective, it would be easier for the sake of
consistency if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorized a
heightened standard at the pleading stage of Section 1983 prison
claims.
The Eleventh Circuit is also convinced that a heightened pleading
standard is necessary for Section 1983 prison claims.  The Eleventh
Circuit limited Leatherman and its prohibition of heightened pleading
to municipal liability actions and continues to apply heightened plead-
ing to other types of Section 1983 claims.254  The Eleventh Circuit
found Leatherman noncontrolling outside of the municipal liability
context because Leatherman’s holding concerns a Section 1983 claim
where a municipality is the defendant.255  When the Eleventh Circuit
244. Id. at 1427–28.
245. Id. at 1434.
246. Id. at 1433–34; Lester, supra note 238, at 446–47. R
247. FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
248. Lester, supra note 238, at 446. R
249. FED. R. CIV. P. 7 (“Only [the following] pleadings are allowed: (1) a complaint; (2) an
answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim; (4) an
answer to a crossclaim; (5) a third-party complaint; (6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and
(7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer.”).
250. Lester, supra note 238, at 447. R
251. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (stating that notice pleading is the appropriate pleading standard in
federal court).
252. FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (stating that fraud or mistake require a heightened pleading standard,
but all claims not mentioned need only comply with notice pleading).
253. Lester, supra note 238, at 447. R
254. Fairman, supra note 22, at 585. R
255. Id. (discussing Monell claims, which are also known as municipal liability claims). Two
plaintiffs brought Section 1983 claims against Tarrant County for violations of their civil rights
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Court of Appeals revisited this issue in GJR Investments, Inc. v.
County of Escambia,256 the court held that a heightened pleading
standard is required for Section 1983 claims asserting qualified immu-
nity.257  In GJR, the Eleventh Circuit stated that a heightened plead-
ing standard was necessary to weed out nonmeritorious claims, yet it
did not specify why a heightened standard was necessary for qualified
immunity claims but not other Section 1983 claims.258  Therefore, for
clarity, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be amended to state
which pleading standard is necessary for Section 1983 prison claims.
The Ninth Circuit also applies heightened pleading but only to a
subset of Section 1983 claims when intent is an element of the tort.259
If subjective intent is an element of the tort and qualified immunity is
pled, a plaintiff is subjected to a heightened pleading standard and
must plead nonconclusory allegations that set forth specific evidence
of unlawful acts.260  In Housley v. United States,261 the Ninth Circuit
held that heightened pleading is still a valid standard post-
Leatherman.262  Section 1983 needs clarification in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure because many circuit courts believe that a height-
stemming from improper searches of their homes.  Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelli-
gence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1993).
256. 132 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 1998).  The plaintiff-developer sought to build a campground
and submitted four applications to public officials for approval. Id. at 1362.  The first three were
denied, so the developer filed suit against the public officials under Section 1983. Id. The dis-
trict court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 1367.  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded and held that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to
show it was similarly situated to other persons, that defendants had a discriminatory intent, or
that appellants were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1367–70.
257. Id. at 1370; Fairman, supra note 22, at 587. See generally, Qualified Immunity, BLACK’S R
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Immunity from civil liability for a public official who is
performing a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not violate clearly established
constitutional or statutory rights.”).
258. GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at 1367.
259. Fairman, supra note 22, at 587. R
260. Id. at 588.
261. 35 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Galbraith v. Cty. Of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119
(9th Cir. 2002).  An inmate filed a claim against law enforcement officials and alleged that illegal
searches and unauthorized electronic surveillance violated his constitutional and statutory rights.
Id. at 401.  The district court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim because it
did not satisfy a heightened pleading standard. Id.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
and remanded and held that the “heightened pleading requirement . . . [did] not apply to [plain-
tiff’s] complaint because defendants’ subjective intent [was] not an element of his . . . claim.” Id.
However, heightened pleading is appropriate when subjective intent is an element of a Section
1983 claim. Id.
262. Id. at 401; Fairman, supra note 22, at 588, 588 n.283. R
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ened pleading standard for Section 1983 claims is necessary to meet
the needs of the court.263
The D.C. Circuit required notice pleading for Section 1983 claims,
but in Crawford-El v. Britton,264 the court offered several suggestions
for trial courts to require fact-based pleading while still complying
with Leatherman.265  The court offered suggestions in dicta to solve
the conflicts between qualified immunity in subjective-intent claims
and burdensome discovery.266  These suggestions, some of which are
adopted by the other circuits—such as the Rule 7 reply process—267
are backhanded ways for the court to comply with a notice pleading
standard while still requiring a heightened pleading standard in
practice.
The Third Circuit requires notice pleading for Section 1983 claims
brought in federal court but has been known to ask for more specific-
ity for the sake of clarity.268  For example, in Ersek v. Township of
Springfield,269 the district court asked the plaintiff to clarify his allega-
tions and state explicitly which defendants were responsible for the
wrongful acts.270  The court reasoned that Leatherman justified this
request because the court did not ask the plaintiff to amend the com-
plaint to meet a level of heightened pleading, but rather, it merely
asked the plaintiff to plead with “intelligible particularity.”271  There is
arguably no difference between heightened pleading and intelligible
263. GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at 1370; Schultea v. Wood (Schultea II), 47 F.3d 1427, 1433–34 (5th
Cir. 1995); Housley, 35 F.3d at 401; Ersek v. Twp. of Springfield, 822 F. Supp. 218, 225 (E.D. Pa.
1993), aff’d, Ersek v. Twp. of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 1996).
264. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
265. Id. at 597–99 (offering procedural suggestions for trial courts to combat the conflict be-
tween notice pleading for Section 1983 claims and burdensome discovery, such as ordering a
Rule 7 reply, granting a Rule 12 motion for a more definite statement, tailoring discovery under
Rule 26, weeding out insubstantial claims with Rule 56 summary judgment, or using Rule 11
sanctions).
266. Fairman, supra note 22, at 589 (explaining that the suggestions include ordering a Rule 7 R
reply, granting a Rule 12 motion for a more definite statement, tailoring discovery under Rule
26, weeding out insubstantial claims with Rule 56 summary judgment, or Rule 11 sanctions).
267. See supra notes 242–53, 264–66 and accompanying text (explaining that both the Fifth R
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit authorize a heightened pleading standard for a Rule 7 reply).
268. Wolff, supra note 15, at 456–57, 473. R
269. 102 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  Appellant-employee challenged the summary judgment
granted in favor of appellee-employers in appellant’s civil rights action, which alleged that appel-
lees’ “false statements [in the newspaper reports] impaired [appellant’s] opportunities for future
employment as a golf pro.” Id. at 84.  The court held that the claim failed, even with particular-
ity, as there was insufficient evidence to prove that the false statements themselves caused the
appellant harm. Id. at 81.  The court upheld the district court’s decision to require the complaint
to be clarified. Id. at 85.
270. Ersek v. Twp. of Springfield, 822 F. Supp. 218, 224 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 102 F.3d 79 (3d
Cir. 1996).
271. Id. at 225.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 30 18-JAN-16 12:32
242 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:213
particularity, but the court found a way around Leatherman because it
deemed a heightened pleading standard necessary.272
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court held that notice pleading or
plausibility pleading is the appropriate standard, the Court has par-
tially created the disconnect between the federal standard and the ac-
cepted practices in the circuit courts.273  In other words, the circuit
courts are aware of Leatherman’s holding, but they are unsure of how
much deviance they can get away with when imposing particularity
restrictions on Section 1983 prison claims.274  The relevant U.S. Su-
preme Court holdings contain considerable room for maneuverability,
specifically because Leatherman’s holding is limited to municipal lia-
bility cases.275  Although the federal circuits should follow the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision, these courts find it necessary to use round-
about ways and to respond to frivolous Section 1983 prison claims that
congest the federal docket.  Notwithstanding the reasons for height-
ened pleading stated supra, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be amended to require heightened pleading in Section 1983
prison litigation for the sake of clarity.
D. The Arguments Advocating Against Heightened Pleading for
Section 1983 Claims Are Flawed
There are several arguments against a heightened pleading standard
for Section 1983 claims.276  Nonetheless, a heightened pleading stan-
dard for Section 1983 prison claims is the best solutions for the effi-
ciency and fairness of the federal court system.  The arguments against
a heightened pleading standard for Section 1983 prison claims proceed
as follows: (1) notice pleading does not allow meritless cases; (2)
heightened pleading is unfair to prisoner-plaintiffs; (3) Rule 8 protects
disfavored prison-litigants; (4) summary judgment can be used in
place of heightened pleading; and (5) heightened pleading is
unworkable.277
272. Id. (requiring heightened pleading despite Leatherman’s direction otherwise).
273. Fairman, supra note 86, at 1062. R
274. See supra note 263 (explaining that courts implement varying pleading standards). R
275. Fairman, supra note 86, at 1063 (explaining that while the rhetoric of Leatherman is R
sweeping, the holding is very narrow as it applies to municipal liability cases).  While Crawford-
El states the importance of adherence to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it provides an
“out” for circuit courts if they want to apply heightened pleading. Id.  In Swiekiewicz v. Sorema,
N.A., the U.S. Supreme Court reinforced the rule of notice pleading but stated that there are
limited exceptions without giving more direction. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
276. Supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. R
277. See infra notes 278–303. R
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At the root of the argument for heightened pleading is the assump-
tion that notice pleading lets in too many meritless cases;278 however,
one study claims that complaints surviving the notice pleading stan-
dard are just as likely to be successful as those complaints surviving
the heightened pleading standard.279  This research suggests that there
is no correlation between the heft of a pleading and the ultimate suc-
cess of a case.280  While this argument has merit, the overall benefits
of the heightened pleading standard is not that it keeps unsuccessful
claims off the docket, but that it lightens the docket in general.  This is
important because Section 1983 prison claims constitute such a large
portion of the federal docket; the docket should not be weighed down
by meritless claims, such as prisoners complaining of inadequate lawn
care or inadequate desserts.281  Further, other critics argue that Sec-
tion 1983 prison claims are not frivolous but only reflect judges’ own
hostility toward inmate civil rights cases.282
Other scholars argue that it is unfair to protect the defendant from
burdensome litigation while placing a heightened burden on disadvan-
taged plaintiffs.283  However, a heightened pleading standard does not
mean that prison officials can violate prisoner rights.  Prison officials
will still be held accountable when an inmate pleads the nature of the
violation with factual particularity.284  Because the typical schedule of
an inmate affords them time to draft complaints,285 it should not be a
problem for them to recount an instance of unconstitutional abuse.286
278. Reinert, supra note 23, at 119 (“For its advocates, heightened pleading promises to re- R
duce crowded dockets, make discovery available to only worthy litigants, and generally improve
the quality of litigation to which attorneys and federal courts devote their attention.  And at the
bottom of it all lies a fundamental assumption: notice pleading lets in too many meritless cases,
and heightened pleading will keep them out.”).
279. Id. at 120 (“The data reported here show that pleadings that survive a notice pleading
standard but not a heightened pleading standard . . . are just as likely to be successful as those
cases that would survive heightened pleading.”).
280. Id. (“[T]here is no correlation between the heft of a pleading and the ultimate success of
a case.”).
281. Supra note 177 and accompanying text. R
282. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 22, at 576. R
283. See, e.g., id.
284. See generally Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the
allegations and supporting evidence of unconstitutional motive by a correction officer satisfied
the heightened pleading requirements of the D.C. Circuit, but the inmate failed to allege actual
injury to his litigation, so the case was remanded to permit the inmate to add nonconclusory
allegations showing actual injury); CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS
GUILD, supra note 2, at 1 (explaining that a prisoner can file several different kinds of cases R
about conditions and treatment in prison).
285. See N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 24 Hours in Prison, http://.doc.state.nc.us//HOURS24.htm
(lasted visited Nov. 13, 2014).
286. See e.g., Stringer v. Thompson, 537 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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Additionally, prisoners have sufficient resources, such as access to law
libraries, guides on how to conduct research,287 and legal aid clinics.288
Others argue that a heightened pleading standard is not necessary
because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 sometimes protects disfa-
vored litigants, such as prisoners and the poor.289  While some litigants
file suits over and over again, Rule 8 states that repeat litigants should
not be subject to a stricter pleading standard.290  Although courts are
not allowed to make the inference that individuals who filed frivolous
lawsuits in the past file frivolous lawsuits in the present,291 no party
will likely be substantially harmed if plaintiffs are required to plead
facts when alleging a Section 1983 violation because it will enhance
the chance of the lawsuit containing allegations with merit.  Propo-
nents of notice pleading also point out that Rule 8 sometimes helps
the poor, who often have less to lose by bringing lawsuits,292  and pro
se prison litigants who cannot afford an attorney and do not under-
stand the pleading standards.293  This argument is not valid because
there are numerous legal aid clinics, help desks, legal aid law firms,
and pro bono attorneys who assist prisoners in filing Section 1983 liti-
gation.294  Additionally, courts often appoint counsel to pro se liti-
287. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 2, at 105–12 R
(describing an introduction to legal research for a federal prison lawsuit); Am. Ass’n of Law
Libraries, List of Law Libraries Serving Prisoners, http://.aallnet.org//sr//-Database.html (last vis-
ited July 9, 2015).
288. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 2, at 134–35 R
(describing various sources of legal support, for example, the Prisoner Self Help Legal Clinic).
289. Marcus, supra note 116, at 473–79.
290. Id. at 473–74.
291. Id.; see also MAUT & WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE 86 (5th ed. 2012) (stating that evidence
is not admissible if the relevant purpose is propensity).
292. Marcus, supra note 116, at 477.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Free/Low Cost Legal Services, www.cookcountycourt.org//.aspx (last visited
Nov. 13, 2014); ILL. LEGAL ADVOC., www.illinoislegaladvocate.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2014);
ILL. LEGAL AID, www.illinoislegalaid.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2014); ILL. PRO BONO, www.illi
noisprobono.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).  These examples are only for the state of Illinois,
but legal aid exists in every state. See e.g., About PLSNY, PRISON LEGAL SERVICES OF NEW
YORK (2013), http://plsny.org/ (“PLS’ mission is to provide high quality, effective legal represen-
tation and assistance to indigent prisoners, to help them to secure their civil and human rights,
and to advocate for humane prisons and for a more humane criminal justice system.”); About
Us, PA. PRISON SOC’Y, http://www.prisonsociety.org/#!about-us-main/cjg9 (last visited Sept. 27,
2015) (“Prison Society has advocated on behalf of people in prison and their families.  The or-
ganization promotes humane and restorative corrections by serving thousands of prisoners, ex-
prisoners and their family members each year through direct services and programs.”); About
Us, PRISON L. OFF., http://www.prisonlaw.com/about.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (“The
Prison Law Office provides free legal services to California state prisoners, and occasionally to
California state parolees.”).
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gants to alleviate this concern.295  Therefore, it is not overly
burdensome for litigants to include factual allegations in their
complaint.
Some argue that a motion for summary judgment pursuant Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56296 is an alternative to heightened plead-
ing.297  A critic argues that a motion for summary judgment is better
suited to dispose of frivolous lawsuits than a heightened pleading stan-
dard.298  While both procedures may effectively rid the federal docket
of frivolous lawsuits, a motion for summary judgment still takes up the
court’s time and constitutes space on the docket, whereas a height-
ened pleading standard for Section 1983 lawsuits is more likely to de-
ter the filing of frivolous suits altogether.299
Another critic argues that heightened pleading is inherently un-
workable.300  According to this critic, heightened pleading is unwork-
able because there is inconsistency as to the treatment of civil rights
plaintiffs—some courts accept heightened pleading and others reject
it.301  In addition to being procedurally inconsistent, the argument as-
serts that a heightened pleading standard has several different mean-
ings.302  Courts are unsure about the amount of detail to require, or
courts try to describe the standard to no avail.303  This argument may
be true, but it also demonstrates the necessity of amending the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.  An amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would provide the judicial branch with direction, con-
sistency, and detail.  It should be clear to the circuit courts that height-
ened pleading is necessary for Section 1983 prison claims, and the
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will outline ex-
actly what a heightened pleading standard looks like.
295. Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17 (explaining that private counsel is R
often court appointed to prisoners litigating Section 1983 claims).
296. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (stating that a party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense, or the part of each claim or defense, on which summary judgment is
sought).  The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion. Id.
297. Cottrell, supra note 25, at 1109. R
298. Id.
299. Fairman, supra note 22, at 564. R
300. Id. at 590–93.
301. Id. at 590–91.
302. Id. at 591.
303. Id. at 591–92 (arguing that even when courts attempt to explain the heightened pleading
standard, they often fall short because “specific, nonconclusory factual allegations” is not a
phrase understood by the average litigant).
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IV. IMPACT
Once the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are amended to require
heightened pleading for Section 1983 prison claims, both federal and
state courts will be more capable of seeking justice for prisoners.  This
change will occur by: (1) reducing the crowded federal court docket;
(2) returning Section 1983 prison claims to state courts; (3) creating
uniformity between federal and state courts; and (4) clarifying the ap-
propriate pleading standard for Section 1983 claims.
While federal courts adhere to a standard of notice pleading,304
many state courts require fact pleading.305  This disparity means that
inmate-civil-rights litigants, or any plaintiff for that matter, will be
subjected to a more lenient pleading standard if their lawsuit is
brought in federal court as opposed to state court.306  This disparity is
especially apparent with Section 1983 prison claims in states that ad-
here to fact pleading.  For example, in Illinois, a fact pleading state,
Section 1983 claims are predominantly brought in federal court in-
stead of state court.307  By imposing a heightened pleading standard,
frivolous lawsuits will be deterred because plaintiffs will have a
heightened burden to meet.308  This will likely impact the volume of
Section 1983 prison claims because they are often presumed frivolous
by some judges.309  Because federal courts are congested,310 a lighter
load on the federal docket will likely increase the efficiency of the
justice system.311
Further, if the state and federal pleading standards mirror each
other, Section 1983 prison claims will be filed in both state and federal
courts, which would likely lighten the federal docket’s load of Section
1983 prison claims.312  By assumption, once pleading standards mirror
each other in both state and federal court, inmates will have one less
incentive to bring their lawsuits in federal courts as opposed to state
304. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 45, 48 (1957).
305. See supra notes 138–48 and accompanying text. R
306. Id.
307. Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17. R
308. Fairman, supra note 22, at 576. R
309. William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in
the Federal Courts, 92 HARV.  L. REV. 610, 618 (1979) (stating that 1976, approximately 70% of
civil rights actions filed by inmates were dismissed as a result of initial judicial review under
Section 1915).
310. See Blaze, supra note 3, at 935. R
311. Interview with Michael Pasquinelli, supra note 17 (speculating that if there are fewer R
cases to litigate, more attention can be given to each lawsuit).
312. Id. (explaining that inmate litigation is often brought in federal court because in Illinois,
the state pleading standard is stricter than the federal pleading standard); see supra notes 138–48 R
and accompanying text.
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courts unless otherwise appropriate to do so.  It is a core principal of
federalism that judicial power must be shared between the state and
federal government.313  If both state and federal courts share the bur-
den of litigating Section 1983 prison claims, justice will be more attain-
able for prisoners who suffered a legitimate infringement on their
constitutional rights.
While state and federal courts often differ on the accepted pleading
standard,314 a heightened pleading standard for Section 1983 prison
claims would bring uniformity to the courts.  Uniformity between fed-
eral and state courts is valued for the sake of clarity as established
supra.315  Additionally, prisoners are often among the poor and uned-
ucated group of society, so clarity as to the pleading standard would
be beneficial to them—especially pro se litigants.316
Moreover, although clarity is valued for civil rights litigants, clarity
is also necessary for the circuit courts.  Since Leatherman,317 circuit
courts have been implementing roundabout methods and standards to
require heightened pleading for Section 1983 claims while still com-
plying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.318  Even though these
federal circuits feel the need to address the pleading standard for Sec-
tion 1983 prison claims and require heightened pleading, they should
be following the direction of the U.S. Supreme Court, which requires
notice pleading.319  After Leatherman, an amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is necessary to dictate the appropriate plead-
ing standard for Section 1983 prison claims because it will sweep more
broadly than the holding of Leatherman, leaving no doubt as to the
appropriate pleading standard for Section 1983 prison claims.320  By
amending Rule 9 to include Section 1983 as an exception to notice
pleading, thus requiring a heightened pleading standard, the federal
courts will no longer be left with any doubt as to what the appropriate
pleading standard is.  This amendment will dissipate confusion, en-
hance judicial efficiency, and bring justice to all parties involved.
313. Cooperative Federalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 729, 1278 (10th ed. 2014).
314. See supra notes 138–48 and accompanying text. R
315. See supra notes 241–75 and accompanying text. R
316. Marcus, supra note 116, at 473–77. R
317. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993).
318. See supra notes 241–75 and accompanying text. R
319. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (18th
ed. 2013) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court is the supreme law of the land).
320. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which
authorizes heightened pleading, does not apply to Section 1983 municipal liability actions).
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V. CONCLUSION
Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is necessary for the
reasons stated in this Comment.  First, a heightened pleading standard
is imperative to combat forum shopping and increase the federal
courts’ efficiency.321  Because federal courts require notice pleading
and many state courts require fact pleading, an overwhelming major-
ity of Section 1983 claims are brought in federal court as opposed to
state court, which decreases the federal courts’ efficiency.322  A sub-
stantial number of Section 1983 claims should be litigated in state
court because they involve state-official defendants.323  Second, Sec-
tion 1983 prison claims are similar to fraud or mistake—the two stated
exceptions to notice pleading.324  Fraud and mistake are exceptions to
notice pleading because they are quasi-criminal offenses; similarly,
Section 1983 prison claims are quasi-criminal offenses because they
often relate to conditions of confinement involving punitive segrega-
tion, excessive force, and physical disciplinary measures.325  Finally,
many federal courts subject Section 1983 prison claims to a height-
ened pleading standard already, so the rules should mirror reality.326
There are circuit splits differing over the proper pleading standard for
Section 1983 prison claims because many states feel that embracing
heightened pleading would deter frivolous lawsuits, protect defend-
ants, and increase efficiency.327
Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 to include Section
1983 prison claims will reduce the crowded federal court docket, re-
turn Section 1983 prison claims to state courts, create uniformity be-
tween federal and state courts, and clarify the appropriate pleading
standard.328  Most importantly, heightened pleading will allow courts
to address the true purpose behind Section 1983 prison litigation:
bringing justice to those inmates who suffered a constitutional harm
and brought a meritorious claim before the court.  Protecting the con-
321. See supra notes 188–210 and accompanying text. R
322. Id.
323. Fairman, supra note 22, at 575. R
324. See supra notes 211–40 and accompanying text. R
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 241–75 and accompanying text. R
327. Id.
328. See supra notes 304–20 and accompanying text. R
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stitutional rights of the imprisoned is vital for a fair society, but this
can only be accomplished if the procedural rules are clarified.
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